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1 Abstrat
One of the best examples of traditional analysis of evolutionary stable strate-
gies (ESS) is provided by the so alled Dove-Hawk model. In this paper we
present several enhanements to the model aimed at desribing the evolution
of ooperative behavior. In addition to Doves and Hawks we introdue sev-
eral groups of Cooperators, who at as Doves within their own group, but
as Hawks outside it. This allows to study how ooperating groups may grow
and ahieve stability within a nonrepeating evolutionary games framework.
Depending on initial onditions, the nal stable population may have one,
all-enompassing Cooperator population or several ompeting liques. Af-
ter taking into aount that Cooperators bear osts neessary to reognize
members of one's own group it is possible to see populations where Cooper-
ators eventually lose against Hawks or populations where several liques of
Cooperators oexist with a Hawk population.
2 Theoretial bakground
The lassial works by Maynard Smith[1, 2℄ introduing and popularizing the
evolutionary game theory and the onept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy
have resulted in widespread interest in suh modeling approah by soial
sientists, biologists and eonomists.
∗
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Within the evolutionary games theory one desribes a population on-
sisting of NTOT `players', who interat among themselves. The form of the
interation is simplied to `ontests', whih are single events during whih
two players deide how to share among themselves some valuable resoure.
For simpliity it is usually assumed that the resoure value is onstant (de-
noted by V ). For `peaefully' resolved ontests the value is divided among
the partiipant players (equally or unequally). In situations where ontests
develops into a ght over the resoure, players partiipating in the ght may
suer injuries, expend unneessary resoures et., whih is modeled by in-
luding a penalty ost −h (harm). For simpliity the ost h is assumed to
be equal for both players partiipating in a ght.
There are two main variants of evolutionary games: Nonrepetitive, single
instane ontests, in whih partiipants have no memory of previous en-
ounters and thus annot adapt their strategies to past behaviour of their
opponents, and Repetitive Games, where the memory allows ompliated
strategies, individual behavior and learning.
Within this paper we onentrate on Nonrepetitive Games. Even for suh
simplied situation players may use dierent strategies. To ahieve the status
of Evolutionary Stable Strategy, spei behaviour σ must either: do better
against itself than any other variant strategy or, if some mutant strategy
would do just as well against σ as σ itself, then σ must do better against the
mutant than the mutant against itself [1℄.
The modeling o the population dynamis is best performed assuming
that the ativities take plae within separate rounds or iterations. Suh
iterations may orrespond, for example, to yearly yles or biologial genera-
tions  or may not orrespond to any disernible quantization of the modeled
system, but be a onvenient simpliation. Within suh iterations players
interat among themselves and ompete for resoures. Between iterations,
following the average outomes (payos) for dierent groups, the omposition
of the total player population is adjusted. After several (many) iterations one
an determine whih of the strategies sueeds and beomes an ESS.
The best known of suh models is the Hawk-Dove model of Maynard
Smith and Prie[1℄. The population onsists of two groups: Doves (D) and
Hawks (H). These groups are best haraterized by their behavior in on-
tests. When a Dove meets a Dove, they resolve the ontest peaefully, with-
out a ght. The value V is then, statistially, split in half between the
ontestants. Thus the average outome (payo) for a player in a D-D math
is V/2. When a Dove meets a Hawk, the latter `bullies' the Dove and gets
the whole value of V , leaving the Dove empty handed. On the other hand,
when two Hawks meet a ght ensues and the average payo is V/2− h. For
V/2−h > 0 (if only `pure' strategies are allowed) the Hawk beomes an ESS,
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by virtue of winning the ontests with the Doves.
The Hawks and Doves model serves as perfet example that an evolution-
ary stable strategy is not neessarily the one that returns thee best results
for the partiipating players. In a pure Dove population the average pay-
o of V/2 is greater than in Hawk population. Nevertheless, beause the
outome of inter-`speies' enounters are always favorable to Hawks, even
a small Hawk population would invade a Dove soiety and have evolution-
ary advantage. In a Dove population invaded by Hawks, the average payo
diminishes as the proportion of Hawks grows.
The aim of this paper is to desribe some onsequenes of the extension
of the Hawk-Dove model within a nonrepetitive paradigm. The extension
is based upon an introdution of a new strategy, alled here `Cooperator'.
A Cooperator behaves like a Dove  when it ompetes with a member of
its own group. But when a Cooperator enounters a Hawk or a Dove it
behaves as a Hawk. To obtain more general results we introdue several
separate Cooperator groups, denoted by Ci, whih at friendly within their
own group, but ompetitively outside it. In the simplest ase, with just one
Cooperator group, the dynamis of the system is trivial. The Cooperator
payo is always better than the payo for a Hawk. Cooperators ould easily
invade a Dove soiety. Thus single group Cooperator strategy is an ESS.
It is worth noting, that although we play the game without `memory', to
allow the Cooperator-like behavior some sort of reognition of group mem-
bership is neessary. This an be ahieved through some labeling, pre-ontest
behaviour et
1
.
As we are interested in exploring further further than the single Coop-
erator group, that is into the formation and stability of populations with
several ompetitive Cooperator groups Ci. Although in general one expets
Cooperators to fare better than Hawks and Doves, it is interesting to see in
what onditions stable population ompositions involve just one dominant
lique and when more liques form and persist. We have enhaned the range
of their possible behaviours by inluding the possibility of transfer of Co-
operators from dierent groups (reruitment). In partiular, we propose a
model in whih during an enounter between two ooperators from dierent
groups rst hek possibility of reruitment (that is one of the players may
onsider joining the other's group `on the spot ')  and then both players be-
have friendly in the enounter. Only when reruitment fails the two players
resort to ompetitive strategy. In general, inlusion of reruitment ompli-
ates the model, but allows modeling of phenomena suh as soial group
1
As always where labeling is present, it opens the eld for mimiry or heating behavior.
Eets of suh strategies will be analysed elsewhere
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dynamis. One should remark, that suh reruitment is possible when Co-
operators not only invest in some means of reognizing agents from various
groups (inluding one's own), but also have some means of establishing the
reasons for joining (suh as results in previous iteration, or group size) during
an enounter.
To give our model more preise form, let's dene ND as number of Doves,
NH as number of Hawks, NCi as number of Cooperators of ooperator group
Ci. The number of Cooperator groups is denoted by NCG. We assume that
the population size is onstant, NTOT
NTOT = ND +NH +
∑
i
NCi (1)
Additionally we dene NC =
∑
iNCi .
For a given iteration we introdue average payos for eah of the groups,
PD, PH and PCi . Assuming that simulation round onsists of ontests of all
players among themselves we easily derive:
PD =
(ND − 1)V/2
NTOT
(2)
PH =
NDV + (NH − 1)(V/2− h) +NC(V/2− h)
NTOT
(3)
PCi =
NDV + (NH)(V/2− h) + (NCi − 1)V
NTOT
+
∑
j 6=i
(
pj→iNCjV/2 + (1− pj→i)NCj (V/2− h)
)
NTOT
(4)
Within equation 4 the probability of player from group j joining the group
of just enountered player i is denoted by pj→i. Suh a probability may, of
ourse be modelled in many ways. For the purposes of this paper we use the
following assumptions:
pj→i = 0 for δji < Tj = tP˜Cj
pj→i = f(δji) for δji ≥ Tj = tP˜Cj (5)
where δji is the dierene in payos for Cooperator group i and group j in
the previous iteration:
δji = P˜Ci − P˜Cj (6)
The presented model reets two aspets of the reruitment: a player
would agree to join a group with better results than his own (δji > 0) and
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it would join only if the pereived benets (based on previous round results)
exeeded ertain threshold Tj . We have set a simple model of the threshold
being a xed proportion (t) of the results ahieved by player's own group in
previous round.
When the threshold is exeeded, probability of reruitment beomes nonzero.
Dierent theoretial approahes may use dierent forms desribing the re-
ruitment probability. We have deided to model the probability by relatively
simple form of funtion f :
f(δji) =
δji − Tj
δji + Tj
(7)
With this hoie probability is small for payo dierenes just above the
threshold, while they grow to ∼ 1 when the payo dierene is onsiderable
(ompared to the threshold for eah group), see Figure 1.
So far the `intra-iteration' population dynamis were disussed. When the
phase desribing agents enounters is nished, then, aording to the values of
payos for eah `speies' and group we model the `inter-iteration' dynamis.
Here again, exibility of hoie for the mehanisms is onsiderable. Within
this work we use a relatively straightforward form of updates to populations.
The payo for eah group Pα (where α stands forD, H , or Ci) is ompared
to the average payo PAV for the whole population. Normalized deviation
for group α is dened as:
Dα = Pα/PAV − 1. (8)
We dene then
D =
√∑
α
D2α (9)
φα = Dα/D. (10)
The new size of group N ′α is then modelled as follows:
N ′α =
Nαe
φα/S
M
if |Dα| > TG
N ′α = Nα if |Dα| ≤ TG (11)
where M is a normalizing fator ensuring that the total population remains
onstant and Nα is the size of the group after the reruitment phase. S is an
artiial damping fator used to derease the sale of inter-iteration hanges
and smooth out simulations. Eet of S is marginal  it aets mostly the
number of simulations until stability is reahed, but not the nal outome.
The threshold TG is introdued to model the situation in whih relatively
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small (i.e. smaller than TG) dierenes in payos should not have signiant
eet on population dynamis. The reasoning behind suh a threshold is
based on observation that in `real life' situations, fators other than diret
ompetitiveness inuene the survival and hanges in population and may
smooth out the payo dierenes if these are suiently small.
3 Reognition osts
One of the most interesting simple enhanements is an inlusion of `label-
ing ost', that is the ost borne by Cooperators to provide reliable means
of reognition and determination of group membership. The osts may have
dierent origin and form, depending on the modelled system (suh as behav-
ioral osts, osts of group uniforms et.).
We propose here a simple approah in whih the labeling ost l is equal
for all Cooperators and is applied to all ontests, before the ontest is re-
solved. This orresponds to Cooperators investing in spei behavior or a
reognizable `uniform' displayed at all meetings with the purpose of showing
the group membership. In suh ase the payo for Cooperators in all ontests
is diminished by l. Thus the expeted payo for a Cooperator from group Ci
beomes:
Pl,Ci =
ND(V − l) + (NH)(V/2− h− l) + (NCi − 1)(V − l)
NTOT
+
∑
j 6=i
(
pj→iNCj (V/2− l) + (1− pj→i)NCj (V/2− h− l)
)
NTOT
(12)
Obviously for l > h Cooperators are at distint disadvantage to Hawks
and do not have any hane to beome an ESS. On the other hand, for the
opposite situation (l < h) we have quite interesting situations. Lets rst
onentrate on a simple ase with just one group of Cooperators, ompeting
with Hawks and Doves.
The dierene in expeted payo for the Cooperators and Hawks beomes
Pl,C − PH =
1
NTOT
(ND(V − l) + (NC − 1)(V/2− l) +NH(V/2− h− l)
−NDV −NC(V/2− h)− (NH − 1)(V/2− h)) (13)
assuming that NH , NC ≫ 1 we an simplify the above expression to
Pl,C − PH =
1
NTOT
(NC(h− l)− (NH +ND)l) (14)
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As the Doves are at disadvantage and after suiently long evolution would
die out, we have a simple ondition
Pl,C > PH ⇐⇒
NC
NH
>
l
h− l
(15)
. The interpretation of the above ondition is that a small ooperator group
would not be able to invade a well established Hawk soiety. Thus the ratio
l/(h − l) determines the ourse of evolution through initial onditions (as
disussed in the next setion).
4 Results of simulations
As the number of possible ombinations of the input parameters is enormous,
we have seleted several examples of simulation results, showing typial be-
havior. These results are presented in the following Tables 1 and 2 and
Figures 2-9. In the presented simulation examples we have started from
relatively large Dove population (92% of the total population) and small ad-
mixtures of Hawks and Cooperators. The initial sizes od the Cooperator
groups were assigned randomly. Payo parameters were assigned in a way to
reet non prohibitive ghting osts and labeling osts (V > h > l).
A few general trends an be seen from the presented simulation results.
First, for all ases exept P, population of Doves dereases to zero. This is an
obvious result of the disadvantages that Doves have when faed with more
belligerent groups. In the presented simulation in whih Doves do not die out,
we have assumed relatively high value of TG threshold, equal to 50% of the
average payo. For suh large value, after some iterations, the populations
beome frozen (see Figures 8 and 9), as the payo dierene is too small to
aet any hanges within our model.
Seond, for simulations with zero labeling onstant and `reasonably' small
thresholds, Hawks die out as well. Obviously, the ability to resolve ontest
ostlessly within a Cooperator group always gives Cooperators a better po-
sition.
Interesting behavior may be seen when the labeling ost is nonzero. Then,
depending on the initial set of ontrol parameters the end result may be,
in addition to Cooperators, Hawk population may exist. The dynamis of
the population beomes very dependent not only on the ontrol parameters,
but also on the initial onditions. For example, simulations K and M have
the same set of ontrol parameters, diering only in the initial number of
Hawks and Cooperators. Although in both ases, the respetive sizes of the
populations NH and NC are smaller then few perent of the total population
7
Initial populations
Simulation A B C D E F G H
NTOT 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
ND 9200 9200 9200 9200 9200 9200 9200 9200
NH 500 300 300 300 300 300 150 150
NCG 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Payo and threshold parameters
V 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
h 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
t 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.1
TG 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.20 0.2 0.3 0.1
Final (stable) populations
ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NCG 1 1 1 2 1 2 4 2
NCi 10000 10000 10000 5392 10000 6133 3435 5431
0 0 0 4608 0 3861 3278 4569
0 0 0 0 0 0 1675 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1607 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Examples of simulation results for labeling ost l = 0. Columns
AH desribe dierent simulation runs.
size, the nal omposition is radially dierent. This illustrates the fat that
the initial onditions an play signiant role in the population dynamis.
5 Disussion
5.1 Hawk-Dove-Possessor
In a reent paper [3℄, Yee has presented analysis of the evolutionary stability
of a dierent example of enhanement of the Hawk-Dove game. The analysis
was aimed at situations where there are denite resoures that an be `kept'
between iterations or laimed before ontests. Yee desribed results of a
strategy alled `Possessor' (P), whih is dened as follows: Possessor behaves
like a Hawk if it is urrently the `owner' of the resoure (defending its right to
is vigorously) and like a Dove if it is not an owner (aepting the `rst ome
rst served' mentality). The new strategy, even though oneptually very
8
Initial populations
Simulation I J K L M N O P
NTOT 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
ND 9200 9200 9200 9200 9200 9200 9200 9200
NH 300 300 300 150 170 300 300 300
NCG 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Payo and threshold parameters
V 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
h 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
l 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 2 2 2
t 0.1 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5
TG 0.1 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5
Final (stable) populations
ND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5184
NH 0 5654 10000 0 6077 10000 0 4343
NCG 1 6 0 1 2 0 0 6
NCi 10000 1301 0 10000 2060 0 0 118
0 1357 0 0 1863 0 0 116
0 865 0 0 0 0 0 92
0 796 0 0 0 0 0 86
0 13 0 0 0 0 0 43
0 13 0 0 0 0 0 17
Table 2: Examples of simulation results for nonzero labeling ost l.
simple proves to be eetive against Hawks and Doves. Moreover, behavior
like this is observed both in human soieties and in animals. Nevertheless,
the Possessor strategy, does not lead to ooperation between players, and is
atually a very individualisti position.
5.2 Cruial role of thresholds to obtain nontrivial solu-
tions
In ontrast to the repeated PD games and other studies inluding learning,
enounter memory and adaptive strategies of players the model presented in
this paper does not touh the issue of formation of Cooperator like behaviour
and Cooperator groups. Our aim was rather to study the fators whih might
inuene the dynamis of the populations, espeially whether it is possible
to obtain stable and mixed populations.
The general tendeny shown by simulated populations shows that, in-
deed, suh mixed populations are possible. The key role allowing their for-
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mation is played by the two thresholds introdued into the model. Without
those thresholds arbitrarily small dierenes in payos may dominate the
population evolution. As mentioned before, the ommonsense reason for the
introdution of the thresholds has its roots in the umulative unertainty
of the eets of the fators whih may determine the payo for individual
player, whih are not modelled in our work. Suh `noise' (for example luk
of individual players in nding neessary resoures) would wash out the pay-
o dierenes between groups resulting from disussed strategies if they are
suiently small.
There is an interesting similarity between the presented model and the
analysis of Frank [4℄ of the need of investment in the display and reogni-
tion of intentions and threats. Suh displays are important in repetitive PD
games, ensuring ooperative behaviour. In our ase, within the framework
of Nonrepetitive PD games, labeling allows reognition of group member-
ship and thus of the strategy of the agents in an enounter before the ostly
ompetition takes plae. To reognize the group membership (and thus the
strategy) the agents must, however, pay `reognition osts'. Suh situation
leads to stable mixed population, beause the benet for Cooperators at be-
ing able to reognize Defetors and shirk frommeeting with ould be balaned
by the reognition osts.
The key result of the paper is that a very simple model may lead to the
establishment of several types of populations  orresponding to situations
found in biology or soiology. Depending on initial onditions, the nal
stable population may have one, all-enompassing Cooperator population
or several ompeting liques. After taking into aount labeling osts it is
possible to simulate populations where Cooperators eventually lose against
Hawks or populations where several liques of Cooperators oexist with a
Hawk population.
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Figure 1: Probability of reruitment pj→i as funtion of the payo dierene
δji.
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Figure 2: Example 1  Evolution of population omposition ending in one
dominant Cooperator group. Parameters used: V = 12, h = 4, l = 0, t = 0.1,
TG = 0.1.
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Figure 3: Evolution of payos for the Example 1
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Figure 4: Example 2  Evolution of population omposition ending in several
Cooperator groups. Parameters used: V = 12, h = 4, l = 0, t = 0.3,
TG = 0.3.
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Figure 5: Evolution of payos for the Example 2
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Figure 6: Example 3  Evolution of population omposition for simulation
with nonzero labeling ost ending in several Cooperator groups and Hawk
population. Parameters used: V = 12, h = 4, l = 1.5, t = 0.3, TG = 0.3.
17
-2
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
P
a
yo
ff
Iteration
AVERAGE
Doves
Hawks
Cooperators
Figure 7: Evolution of payos for the Example 3
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Figure 8: Example 4  Evolution of population omposition for simulation
with nonzero labeling ost ending in mixed Dove, Hawk and several Coop-
erator groups. Due to quite high TG value of 0.5 after several iterations
dierenes in payos no longer hange thee populations. Parameters used:
V = 12, h = 4, l = 2, t = 0.5, TG = 0.5.
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Figure 9: Evolution of payos for the Example 4
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